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1(1) There is no dispute about the state of the law
outside the Eleventh Circuit. Six circuits hold that a
plaintiff who proves that an employer’s explanation
was untrue is never required to adduce additional
evidence. Pet. 17-20. In five circuits such a plaintiff
at least usually is not required to offer additional
evidence. Pet. 20-21.
As the United States has correctly explained, on
the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit requires such ad-
ditional evidence in all Title VII cases. In a recently
filed brief, the government spelled out with precision
the legal standard that is applied in that Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit, the government notes, applies
in Title VII cases "the pretext plus approach."1
1 "Pretext plus" is the phrase used by the lower courts to re-
fer to the requirement that a plaintiff both prove that an era-
ployer’s proffered reason is untrue (the "pretext" evidence) and
offer "additional evidence" (the "plus") of discrimination. See
James v. New York Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2000)
("On the Fifth Circuit’s view in Reeves, under a rule often de-
scribed as ’pretext plus,’ some additional evidence is always re-
quired."); Fasold v. Justice, 409 Fo3d 178, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2005) ("In
Reeves, the Court rejected the view of those circuits that had
granted summary judgment for the employer on the ground that
the terminated employee had failed to prove more than employer
pretext (the ’pretext plus’ cases)."); Leake v. Ryan’s Family Steak-
house, 5 Fed.Appx. 228, 232 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[under] the ’pretext-
plus’ standard..., which was the law of this circuit at the time the
district court rendered its decision, Leake was required to demon-
strate that the explanation proffered by Ryan’s was pretextual
and produce evidence (beyond his prima facie case) that the real
reason for his discharge was retaliation for his sexual harassment
complaints. See Vaughan v. Metrahealth Cos., 145 F.3d 197, 202
(4th Cir. 1998). Since the district court decided this case, however,
the Supreme Court has rejected the pretext-plus standard.");
2Secretary’s Brief, Mells v. Secretary, Department of Vet-
eransAffairs, No. 15-14251-GG (11th Cir.), at 31, avail-
able at 2016 WL 1295652 (Feb. 25, 2016) ("Department
of Justice Brief").
[T]his Court has interpreted Reeves [v. Sand-
erson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000)] to mean that the law no longer per-
mits an inference of unlawful discrimination
based solely on the plaintiff’s proffer of evi-
dence establishing a prima facie case and con-
tradicting the employer’s proffered reasons
for the challenged action, and that the plain-
tiff now must ... not only [show] that the em-
ployer’s proffered reason was a pretext, but
also .o. " ... produce additional evidence sug-
gesting discrimination after contradicting
their employer’s stated reasons .... "Flowers [v.
Troup County School Dist.], 803 F.3d [1329],
1339 [(11th Cir. 2016)].
Department of Justice Brief, 37-38.
The Flowers panel interpreted Reeves to mean
that"[c]ontradicting the [employer’s] asserted
reason alone ... no longer supports an infer-
ence of unlawful discrimination." Id. There-
fore, [plaintiff’s] argument that the district
court incorrectly required her to produce evi-
dence of pretext and additional evidence of
Cervantez v. KMGP Serv. Co., Inc., 349 F.3d 4, 10 (5th Cir. 2009)
("Reeves rejected the higher standard of ’pretext plus,’ which ’re-
quire[d] a plaintiff not only to disprove an employer’s proffered
reasons for the discrimination but also to introduce additional ev-
idence of discrimination.’ ") (quoting Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med.
Pers., LP, 363 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2004)).
discrimination ... ignores this Court’s post-
Reeves decisions regarding the manner in
which Reeves ... modified this Court’s decision
in Combs [v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012 (11th
Cir. 2000)].
Id. at 36. The United States pointed out that the deci-
sion below (and earlier Eleventh Circuit decisions on
which it relied) were of particular importance because
they established a more stringent requirement than
had previously existed in that circuit.
[In Flowers] this Court confirmed that al-
though the law of this circuit (e.g., Combs)
previously allowed plaintiffs to get their em-
ployment discrimination claims before a jury
"after making a prima facie case and merely
contradicting the [employer’s] proffered legit-
imate, nondiscriminatory reason," Reeves had
"closed this avenue for Title VII plaintiffs."
Flowers, 803 F.3d at 1339 (emphasis added).
Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added in Department of Justice
Brief).2
Florida correctly interprets Eleventh Circuit prec-
edent in the same manner as the United States.
2 See id. at 37 ("[in] the post-Reeves decisions (Chapman Iv.
AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000)], Alvarez [v. Royal
Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010)], and Flowers)
this Court explained that the law no longer permits an inference
of unlawful discrimination based solely on the plaintiffs showing
of a prima facie case and evidence contradicting the employer’s
proffered reasons for the challenged action....").
4[A]lthough previously Plaintiff could have
gotten her claims to a jury after making a
prima facie case and undercutting [a defend-
ant’s] proffered legitimate non-discriminatory
reason as pretext, "intervening precedent has
since closed this avenue for Title VII plain-
tiffs." Flowers, [App. 23a]. Contradicting [a de-
fendant’s] asserted reason alone no longer
supports an inference of unlawful discrimina-
tion .... Because Plaintiffhas failed to put forth
any additional evidence that would support
an inference of unlawful discrimination, it is
insufficient for Plaintiff merely to make a
prima facie case and ... call into question
[a defendant’s] proffered, nondiscriminatory
reason. The burden placed on Title VII plain-
tiffs to produce additional evidence is not
great, but neither is it nothing.
Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment,
Jiminez v. Florida Commission on Human Relations,
No. 4:15-cv-00103-RH-CAS (N.D.Fla.), available at 2015
WL 10354050 (emphasis added) ("Florida Brief").3
Within the Eleventh Circuit there simply is no dis-
pute that that circuit requires "additional evidence"
over and above proof that an employer gave a phony
reason to justify a disputed adverse employment ac-
tion. Plaintiffs and defendants alike agree that this is
the rule in the Eleventh Circuit. Compare Answer
3 See Florida Commission on Human Relations’ Trial Mem-
orandum, Jiminez v. Florida Commission on Human Relations,
No. 4:15-cv-00103-RH-CAS (N.D.Fla.), available at 2015 WL
10354046.
5Brief of Appellee, Holmes v. Jefferson County School
District, 2016 WL 1375998, No. 15-15198 (11th Cir.), at
21, available at 2016 WL 1375998 ("Contradicting the
School District’s asserted reason alone, ... no longer
supports an inference of unlawful discrimination.")
(quoting Flowers), with Appellant’s Reply Brief,
Holmes v. Jefferson County School District, No. 15-
15198 (11th Cir.), at 6, available at 2016 WL 1375998
("Defendant argues that [plaintiff] failed to meet the
long-standing disavowed standard of ’pretext-plus’ -
claiming that she failed to present additional evidence
outside of pretext and her prima facie case .... [Plain-
tiff] concedes that a panel of this Court recently held
this to be the standard in Flowers .... [H]owever, [Plain-
tiff] argues that this case is in violation of Reeves .... ").
(2) The brief in opposition systematically ignores
the language of the opinion below which the United
States and Florida correctly understand to be the hold-
ing of that decision.
Respondents insist that the Eleventh Circuit does
not impose an additional evidence requirement. "The
Eleventh Circuit does not always require additional
evidence where evidence suggests that an employer’s
explanation is false. It simply confirmed Reeves’s own
statement that there are some circumstances where
what little evidence of pretext the plaintiff has put for-
ward simply cannot withstand summary judgment."
Br. Opp. 12 (emphasis added and omitted). But the crit-
ical limitation "some" does not appear anywhere in the
opinion below. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit insisted
6without limitation that "[t]he burden [is] placed on Ti-
tle VII plaintiffs to produce additional evidence after
contradicting their employer’s stated reasons .... "App.
24a.4 This definitive statement of the Eleventh Circuit
standard, specifically relied on by the Department of
Justice and quoted in the petition, is never mentioned
in the brief in opposition. See Department of Justice
Brief, 37; Pet. 15, 33.
Respondents point to older Eleventh Circuit deci-
sions from 2001 to 2005 under which plaintiffs previ-
ously were not required to adduce additional evidence,
and insist that the decision below does not "clash with
that court’s prior precedents." Br. Opp. 9.5 But the opin-
ion below was emphatic in explaining that such prece-
dents are no longer good law in the Eleventh Circuit.
"Contradicting the School District’s asserted reason
alone ... no longer supports an inference of unlawful
discrimination." App. 23a. "At one time under this
Circuit’s law, Flowers could have gotten his claims
before a jury after making a prima facie case and
4 See App. 23a ("[c]ontradicting the [defendant’s] asserted
reason alone ... no longer supports an inference of unlawful dis-
crimination"; discrediting an employer’s proffered reason "is
sometimes enough when combined with other evidence...." (quot-
ing Kragor v. Takeda Pharm. A., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2012)) (emphasis in opinion below), 23a-24a ("Because ...
Flowers has failed to put forth any additional evidence that would
support an inference of unlawful discrimination, it is insufficient
for Flowers merely to make a prima facie case and ... call into
question the School District’s proffered legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason.").
~ See Br. Opp. 1 (the panel decision "did not overturn those
decisions").
7merely contradicting the [defendant’s] proffered legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason .... Intervening prece-
dent has since closed this avenue for Title VII
plaintiffs." App. 22a-23a. The latter passage makes
clear that the requirement of additional evidence ap-
plies to "Title VII plaintiffs" generally, not just to some
narrow subset of cases. These definitive statements,
specifically cited by the Department of Justice and the
state of Florida as setting out the Eleventh Circuit
rule, and repeatedly quoted in the petition, are never
mentioned in the brief in opposition. See Department
of Justice Brief, 36; Florida Brief; Pet. 13, 14, 16, 33.
Respondents insist that "[t]he panel in no way sug-
gested that a plaintiff must negate every conceivable
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action taken
against him. It noted only, and correctly, that ’Flowers
has the burden of persuasion on this point, and it is his
responsibility to advance sufficient evidence of racial
discrimination to create a triable factual dispute.’" Br.
Opp. 13 (quoting Pet. App. 21a) (emphasis in brief).
The adverb "only" is incorrect. The sentence from the
opinion quoted in the brief in opposition ("Flowers has
the burden .... ") is preceded on page 21a by an entire
paragraph of the panel opinion specifically devoted to
the failure of the plaintiff to rule out the "virtually lim-
itless possible nondiscriminatory reasons" that might
have prompted the employer’s action. App. 21a. The
court of appeals reasoned that proof an employer’s
proffered justification is a lie only eliminates one
possible nondiscriminatory reason for the disputed
8employment action; "additional evidence" of discrimi-
nation is required because so many other "possible"
reasons remain. This pivotal explanation for the Elev-
enth Circuit’s "additional evidence" requirement, re-
peatedly quoted in the petition, is never mentioned in
the brief in opposition. See Pet. 14, 16, 17, 28, 34.
Even if the panel opinion did announce an "addi-
tional evidence" requirement, respondents assert, that
would just have been dicta, because the court of ap-
peals in any event concluded that plaintiff had failed
to call into question the veracity of the defendants’ ex-
planation. Respondents state that "[t]he panel simply
rejected Flowers’s showing of pretext." Br. Opp. 9 (cit-
ing Pet. App. 22a).~ To the contrary, the panel actually
concluded that the evidence would "support an infer-
ence that the School District’s investigation into Flow-
ers’s potential recruiting violations may have been
pretext of something." App. 19a-20a (emphasis omit-
ted). Respondents claim that "[t]he Eleventh Circuit ...
simply affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that
Flowers did not set forth sufficient evidence to suggest
that the School District’s proffered legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason was false." Br. Opp. 1. To the con-
trary, the panel held that the evidence did call into
6 See Br. Opp. 7 ("The court of appeals [held] there was no
showing of pretext...."), 8 ("The Eleventh Circuit ... conclude[ed]
that [plaintiff] had failed to produce sufficient evidence suggest-
ing that the School District’s proffered reason for terminating him
was pretext."), 11 ("the Eleventh Circuit ... held that Flowers did
not sufficiently rebut the School District’s proffered reason....")
(emphasis in brief in opposition).
9question the veracity of the School District’s story, rea-
soning that"[t]he School District’s ham-handed inves-
tigation and actions singling out Flowers could lead a
reasonable jury to conclude that Pugh had it in for
Flowers from the beginning." App. 20a. The court of ap-
peals’ holdings that there was indeed evidence of pre-
text, quoted in the petition, are never mentioned in the
brief in opposition. See Pet. 12, 13.
In sum, this is not a case in which the respondents
discuss the meaning of the relevant portions of the
court of appeals opinion. Rather, respondents make no
effort to explain and never even refer to the pivotal
passages in the opinion below. Respondents do not
disagree with the interpretation of those passages set
out in the briefs of the Department of Justice and the
state of Florida, and in the petition; instead, respond-
ents simply choose to ignore those operative portions
of the Eleventh Circuit opinion. Such studied silence is
no substitute for a reasoned analysis.
(3) Having prevailed in the court below by
persuading the Eleventh Circuit to adopt a clear
and emphatic "additional evidence" requirement, re-
spondents now seek to avoid review in this Court by
insisting that there was no such holding. But that tac-
tical disavowal of the Eleventh Circuit’s landmark de-
cision is operative in this Court only; in the lower
courts the additional evidence requirement mandated
by the court of appeals is obviously the law. No judge
in that circuit would today hold that a plaintiff can
"g[et] his claims before a jury [by] making a prima facie
case and ... contradicting the [defendant’s] legitimate,
10
nondiscriminatory reason," in light of the Eleventh
Circuit’s emphatic decision that "precedent has ...
closed this avenue for Title VII plaintiffs." App. 22a-
23a. In order to assure that this additional evidence
requirement would control future litigation in the
Eleventh Circuit, the panel went out of its way to des-
ignate its opinion for publication. In that circuit, most
appellate opinions in employment cases are un-
published.
The decision of the Eleventh Circuit imposing
an additional evidence requirement in this Title VII
case warrants review for the reasons that led this
Court to grant review when the Fifth Circuit imposed
such a requirement under the ADEA. Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 140-41. Both decisions conflict with the law in other
circuits, and both requirements pose an often insur-
mountable and always unjustified obstacle to the en-
forcement of the statute at issue. As the United States
explained in its brief in Reeves, the removal of such ob-
stacles is necessary "[t] o overcome the scarcity of direct
proof of discriminatory motive, and to ensure that the
’important national policy’ embodied in the fair em-
ployment laws is achieved." Brief for the United States
and The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Reeves v. Sand-
erson Plumbing Products, Inc., 11 (quoting United
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 716 (1983)).
This case presents the ideal vehicle for
resolving this issue. The court of appeals set out a
clear additional evidence requirement and offered a
11
full-throated explanation for its holding that a Title
VII plaintiff cannot demonstrate the existence of a dis-
criminatory motive "merely" by proving that an em-
ployer’s proffered reason for its actions is a lie. App.
22a. Respondents contend that rejection of this legal
standard would not affect the outcome in this case be-
cause there was no evidence that its explanation was
untrue. Br. Opp. 11. But the court of appeals held that
there was indeed such evidence, and dismissed Flow-
ers’ claim only because under controlling Eleventh Cir-
cuit precedent - unlike the rule in all other circuits -
such proof is legally insufficient.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Elev-
enth Circuit.
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